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"EXPERIMENTAL" CHEMOTHERAPY TREATMENT
FOR ADVANCE STAGE BREAST CANCER:
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE
POLICY COVERAGE

JessicaL. Basso*

A woman who has tried allforms oftherapy talks about hereleven year
journey through breastcancer.Size was cancer-freefor eightyears,
then had a recurrence. She went through a clinical trial, a bone
marrow transplant,which she went into as afantasy but now says was
horrible. But what made it all wortinvhile is that she has had three
years cancerfree,without the chemotherapy that traditionaltreatment
would have offered Now, insteadofasking herself'"hat ifI die?",
she is asking "What ifI live?" That is keeping her sane. Havingthe
choice of experimentaltreatment has given herfreedom.'

INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980's, litigation concerning insurance coverage for

investigational or experimental medical treatments has proliferated.
Compared to the early litigation of the late 1980's, over the past five years
courts have begun finally to permit women to challenge successfully
insurance policy contracts -- the reward being insurance coverage that

may play the largest role in saving their lives.
This article traces the evolution ofjudicial enforcement of insurance
coverage

for questionably

experimental

chemotherapy

treatment

administered to women with advanced-stage breast cancer. First, this
article explains the disease, the controversial treatment, and the efficacy of
the treatment. Second, this article explores the reasons why insurance
policies typically exclude coverage for this particular chemotherapy
treatment and addresses the outcome of litigation from the late 1980's, as
opposed to the current judicial strategy. Finally, this article will explore

*StaffWriter, JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW. B.A., Smith, 1993; J.D. (Cand.),
DePaul University College of Law, 1997.
1 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; Journal of the National Cancer Institute,
Questionsand Choices (1994).
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recent litigation and some of the alternative approaches taken by the courts
when interpreting and enforcing insurance contracts.
DISEASE AND TREATMENT OF BREAST CANCER
The disease of breast cancer is classified into four stages according to the
extent of the disease.' In Stage I, the solid tumor is typically less than one
inch thick and is considered small.3 By Stage II, the tumor is larger,
approximately one to two inches, and the cancer has spread to the auxiliary
lymph nodes.' In Stage III, the tumor is greater than two inches and
adheres to the chest wall.' Finally, by Stage IV, the cancer has
"metastasized," or spread to other organs or parts of the body.'
Breast cancer is the most common type of cancer among women in
the United States today.' More than 1.6 million women living in the
United States today have been treated for breast cancer In addition,
more than one-quarter of these women diagnosed with breast cancer will
eventually die from the disease.9 In the last several years, breast cancer has

been a focus of public attention, as patients have taken it upon themselves
to increase public awareness of the disease through dissemination of
information regarding detection, treatment, cure, and consequences." This
heightened public awareness has in turn, put pressure on lawmakers to
provide both federal and state funding for research to fnd alternative
therapies to traditional radiation and chemotherapy, in order to treat and
cure breast cancer.'
Over the last ten years, physicians have been administering high-dose
chemotherapy treatment in conjunction with autologous bone-marrow

2 Denise S. Wolf, Who Should Payfor 'Erperimental' Treatments? Breast Cancer Patientsv. Their Insurers,
44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029,2038 (1995).
3 Id.
4 Id
5 Id
6 Id
7 Id at 2031.
8 Id
9 Id
10 Id at 2032.
11 Id
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transplants (HDCT-ABMT), a two step procedure, as an alternate
treatment for women with Stage IV breast cancer as an alternative
treatment." The high-dose chemotherapy treatment consists of the
administration of a combination of powerful drugs intended to kill the
cancer cells.13 However, these drugs also have a myeloblative effectf4
Although they destroy malignant cancer cells, they also destroy a woman's
healthy bone marrow cells which produce badly needed red and white
blood cells and platelets.15 Without a minimum number of red or white
blood cells or platelets, a patient is highly susceptible to infection and
bleeding. 6
To counter the drug's destructive effect, before administering the
chemotherapy a physician will extract the patient's own bone marrow cells
(harvesting the cells) and place them temporarily in frozen storage17 The
physician then administers the high-dose chemotherapy to the patient."
Finally, the patient's own healthy bone marrow is intravenously reinfused
in an "autologous transplant" to replace the bone marrow that the
chemotherapy destroyed. 9 The use of the patient's own bone-marrow for
reinfusion reduces any additional complications that could be caused by
rejection of donor marrow.2"
Given a choice between this aggressive and expensive experimental
therapy, and a less-grueling and seemingly far less successful standard
therapy, women with advanced breast cancer are having no difficulty
choosing. Rather, patients with advanced breast cancer are flocking to
receive these high-dose chemotherapy and autologous bone marrow
transplants, placing their hope in what phase H studies have shown to
result in a 20 percent a year disease free survival rate, as opposed to the 2
percent rate cited for standard chemotherapy. 2'

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

See Bchtoldv. Phycians Health Plan of Northern Inidana, Inc., 19 F.3M 322, 324 (7h Cir. EN4).
Id.
i
ICE
I
Sce Beehtold v. P10yicians Health Plan of Northmn Indiana, Ir:, 19 F.3d 322 324 (7h Cir 1524).
Id
ICE
Id
Id
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND HDCT-ABMT
Insurance companies typically exclude coverage for HDCT-ABMT in
health insurance policies for two reasons. First, HDCT-ABMT is an
expensive treatment compared to traditional chemotherapy treatment.22
While costs vary according to the exact combination of drugs
administered per patient, HDCT-ABMT may cost at least $100,000 per
patient as compared to the $15,000 - $40,000 price tag for standard
chemotherapy treatment. 3 Second, while the treatment has proven
effective in treating certain kinds of cancerous blood diseases, such as
Leukemia and Hodgkin's Disease, the efficacy of the treatment when
used on solid-type tumors, such as breast cancer, is disputed among
health care providers. 24 Thus, although women with advanced-stage
breast cancer may have a greater than 65 percent chance of survival
beyond five years with the treatment compared to a 20 percent chance
of survival without treatment, insurance companies are still refusing to
pay for treatment they consider to be "experimental. "25 Instead, these
insurers believe it's neither appropriate nor feasible for them to cover
26
the care for patients hospitalized for the sole purpose of research.
Insurance policies are considered contracts for the purposes of
judicial interpretation. Additionally, since insurance companies draft
their own policies, courts must keep in mind that the insurer has the
power to define all terms included in the contract. While it is an
insurance company's prerogative to cover some treatments and exclude
others from coverage, an insurance company has a responsibility to its
subscribers to outline clearly what procedures will and will not be
indemnified.
Insurance polices are fraught with ambiguities in draftsmanship,

22 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 1.

23 U.S. Department ofHealth and Human Services; Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 87: 952-955 (July
5, 1995).
24 /, at 955.
25 See National Cancer Institute, Bone Marrow Transplantation: Research Report 26 (National Int. of Health
Pub. 92:1178 (1991)).
26 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Journal of the National Cancer lnstitute, 87: 955 (July 5,
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and often in logic. While private health insurance policy contracts
usually have provisions denying coverage for "experimental" treatment,
there are as many definitions of "experiment" as there are suits
challenging whether a procedure is alternative (and covered by
insurance),2' or investigational (and not covered). The exact definition
of "experimental treatment" remains unclear.
In defining its policies regarding treatment, an insurance company
must consider a number of factors in order to define what should be
"investigational" or "experimental" therapy. Some of the major
questions involved include the insurers' views on the following:
(1) Is the therapy administered under an Institutional Review
Board
(IRB)
approved
protocol
considered
"experimental?"

(2) If a therapy is considered standard for one type of illness,
is it therefore standard treatment for other forms of the
same disease?
(3) If a patient receives "standard" therapy, however defined,
for a serious or life-threatening illness and the treatment
fails, does the standard of care require use of

"investigational therapy" and, if so, is payment thus
required? s
The answers reached by insurance companies to these questions are
as diffuse as the questions themselves. Indeed, insurers have been known
to refuse payment arbitrarily based upon the advice an administrator
receives from "friends who are doctors," or based upon the decision of an
insurance company's employee physician, who is usually not a specialist in
the field in question.'
Because insurance companies prefer to avoid paying for expensive
medical treatments at all costs, they are consistently expanding their list of

27 Angela R.Holder, Fuzr&ng Inr,4;ativalcdsca TrcatrnerA 57 ALI3L REV. 795,795 (154).
28 Id.at795.
29 Id.
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treatments that will not be covered. Some policies provide simply that a
company may refuse to pay for any therapy it deems "experimental" or
"investigational" based upon criteria it selects.3" Other health insurers
define experimental services as those that are under "clinical investigation
by health professionals," and "not generally recognized by the medical
professionals tested and accepted medical practice.""1 These insurers will
still try to refuse coverage even when affidavits attesting to the acceptance
of the therapy are submitted by recognized experts in the field." Finally,
some insurers do specify criteria in their policies excluding treatments "not
generally acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suitable
medical specialty practicing in [this state], as decided by us,"33 or by
requiring that all treatments be approved by the Health Care Financing
Administration, the federal agency that determines payments for Medicare
patients.34
Ultimately, since health insurance is a contract drafted independently
35
by each agency, definitions of "investigational" or "experimental" vary
Thus, one insurer may willing pay for treatment X for Y disease while
36
another may refuse even when supplied with identical medical facts.
JUDICIAL APPROACH TO INSURANCE COVERAGE
FOR EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT
Until recently, the issue of insurance coverage for inve:stigational or
experimental treatment received little or no publicity. 37 Within the past
several years, however, the amount of litigation challenging refusals to
cover "investigational treatment," and the publicity surrounding these
cases, have come center stage.38

In the late 1980's, when courts were first confronted by an insurance

30 Id. at 796.

31
32
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id. at 796, 797.
Id.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id.

37 Id.

38 Id. (stating that between February, 1989 and March, 1995, there have been twenty four publlhed case3).
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company's refusal to pay for some form of therapy on the grounds that it
was "experimental" or "investigational," the courts did not bother to
distinguish between the therapies involving "alternative" treatments, and
experimental studies conducted in mainstream research." Consequently,
insurance companies were victorious in virtually all lawsuits brought
against them.4'
Today, courts are starting to realize that insurance policies are often
ambiguous in defining what procedures they do or do not cover. As a
result, policy holders who contract with insurance companies for health
care coverage may not be completely aware ofthe coverage for which they
have contracted. It is this vagueness with which health insurance policies
are riddled, and which courts are now starting to construe against the
drafters through application of fundamental contract law and with an eye
on public policy. Consequently, more and more women are winning their
challenges against insurance companies and are being granted access to
treatment which may save their lives.
One of the most significant decisions regarding an insurance
company's denial of HDC/AMBT thus far is Bailey v. Blue CrossBlue
Shield of Virginia. In Bailey, the plaintiff was suffering from stage IV
breast cancer when her physician recommended that she undergo a form
ofHDC/ABMT treatment as her best chance for survival. 4 Bailey sought
coverage for the procedure from Blue Cross, to which she had access
through her husband's company.42 Blue Cross denied Bailey coverage for
the treatment based on an amendment to her insurance policy that stated,
"Autologous bone marrow transplants or other forms of autologous stem
cell rescue with high dose chemotherapy or radiation are not covered."43
In response to her insurer's denial, Bailey conceded that the PSCR
portion of her treatment was explicitly excluded from the treatment.'
However, she argued that the insurance contract did not specifically

39
40
41
42
43
44

Id. at 796.
Id.
Bailey v. Blue Cross/Blue Sbield of Va.. 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1935).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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exclude high-dose chemotherapy,45 but in fact expressly provided coverage
for chemotherapy and did not distinguish the kind of chemotherapy it
intended to cover. In response, Blue Cross maintained tha its use of the
term "with" unambiguously meant "and," thus when stem cell rescue and

high dose chemotherapy were used together, its policy excluded coverage
for the entire treatment.46
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit approached the issue in
Bailey as one of pure contract interpretation, and found that the language
of the insurance contract was ambiguous as a matter of law. 47 In turn,
since ambiguous contract provisions are construed against the drafter, the
Appeals Court upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and prohibited Blue Cross from denying coverage for Bailey's high
4
dose chemotherapy.
As evidenced by Bailey, courts are finally considering insurance policy
contracts while keeping both the women and the insurance companies in
mind. The courts have achieved this balance by maintaining legal
objectivity through application of basic contract law, while recognizing the
demands of public policy and considering whether the terms of the contract
are ambiguous as to what procedures will and will not be covered based
upon a treatment's experimental nature.49 Since the function of a court in
construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and enforce the intent of the
parties as expressed in a contract, 50 courts must be wary of allowing
sympathies and desires to vitiate clear principles of contract law."
While attempting to remain both objective and sympathetic, courts
have begun to open the door for successful challenges to insurance policies
which include ambiguous language that is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.5" Alternatively, when a policy is explicit as to

45 Id.
46 Bailey v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1995).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Frendreis v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 873 F. Supp. 1153, 1156-1157 (N.D 111.1995).
50 Id. at 1158.
51 Id. at 1159.
52 Id. at 1156. See also Scottish Guaranty Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Dwyer, 19 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 1994); DahlEimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins., 986 F.2d 1379, 1381 (1lth Cir. 1993).
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what kind of treatments it will not indemnify, the courts will find for the
insurance company.
In the Seventh Circuit, for instance, the Court of Appeals determined
that language which details the excluded treatment cannot be ambiguous
as a matter of law. In Betchold v.Physician'sHealth Plan of Northern
Indiana, Inc.,53 the Court found that the particular insurance policy
excluded autologous bone marrow transplantation as unreasonable and
unnecessary treatment for solid tumors. Breast cancer was specifically
listed under this solid tumor exception."4 Consequently, the court
concluded that the plaintiff was "attempting to create an ambiguity in the
contract language where no ambiguity exists."s 5
Likewise, in Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Companies and Rural
CarrierBenefit Plan,56 the Seventh Circuit found that since the policy at
issue explicitly defined Phase I, IL or Il clinical trials as experimental, and
the plaintiffs treatment would be administered according to a clinical trial
protocol identifying the
procedure as "Phase H trial," the contract did not
57
treatment.
the
cover
Finally, in Fujav. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company,s the court
determined that the insurance policy's exclusion of coverage for treatment
administered "in connection with medical or other research" explicitly
permited the insurance company to refuse payment for medical treatment
whose medical efficacy is questioned, and that is still under investigation
in medically recognized and accepted research studies.59
On the other hand, courts have held that when a contract is silent as
to the meaning of its terms, the terms are ambiguous. For example, in
Dahl-Eimersv. Mutual of Omaha Life InsuranceCompany -0 and Pirozzi
v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia,61 the United States Court of

53
54
55
56

Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of Northern Indiana. Inc.. 19 F3d 322. 324 (7th Ctr 194)
Id. at 324.
Id.
Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Companies and Rural zCarrier
Beeit Plan. S92 F-2d 7 0?. 712-713 (7th Cm

1993).
57 Id.

58
59
60
61

Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405. 1410 (7th Cir. 193).
Id.
Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co.. 986 F.2d 1379. 1381-13,,2 (11th Cir, 1593).
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 5S6, 519.590 (ED, Va, 15W)
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, respectively held that when an insurance
policy uses the phrase "considered experimental" to define treatment
standing alone in a major medical insurance policy, the use of the term
"experimental" is ambiguous as a matter of law. Both courts acknowledged that the insurance policies failed to define the term "experimental"
or set forth how it would be determined whether a treatment was
experimental.62 Thus, the contract phrase 'considered experimental,'
without more, gives rise to a genuine uncertainty about who will determine
whether a particular treatment is experimental and how that determination
will be made.63 In Dahl-Eimers,the insurance company even conceded
4
that there could be more than one way to make such a deteinination.6
INTERPRETATION OF UNAMBIGUOUS
INSURANCE POLICIES DENYING
MEDICAL TREATMENT
Even when an insurance policy is unambiguous as to what treatments it
will not cover because they may be considered experimental, courts may
still enable women to receive HDCT-ABMT. A policy which is clear as
to what treatment it considers to be "experimental," does not prevent a
court from examining whether or not the treatment truly is experimental,
and justifiably excluded by the policy.
Because judges themselves are no more qualified to reach medical
conclusions regarding the investigational nature of cancer treatments then
are insurance policy drafters, they often look to physicians. Physicians
themselves, however, cannot decide whether HDCT-ABMT is an
experimental treatment. As a result, judges are beginning to listen to
testimony of many physicians who specialize in the field, and draw
conclusions based upon this expert testimony. In looking beyond the
insurance plan to consider the actual treatment, judges are giving women
even more chances to receive HDCT-ABMT.

62 Id.
64 Dahl-Eimers, 986 F.2d at 1381-1382.
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While jurisdictions remain split on the issue of the experimental nature
of HDCT-ABMT, at least insurance companies are no longer being given
carte blanche to determine independently what kind of treatment is or is
not experimental. For instance, in Holder v. PrudentialInsurance
Company ofAmerica, 5 the Fifth Circuit held that HDCT-ABMT is experimental treatment because it is not administered under a specific, accepted
protocol.66 Similarly, in Hooper v. Demco, Incorporated,7 the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the treatment is experimental."S On the other hand,
in the relatively recent case of Wolf and Wolf v. PrudentialInsurance
Compmy ofAmerica 9 the Tenth Circuit concluded the treatment was not
experimental when the plaintiff presented evidence from two specializing
oncologists that HDCT-ABMT for a woman in plaintiff's situation was
not experimental in 1990-1991 under any reasonable definition of the
term.7"

ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF CHALLENGING INSURANCE
POLICIES WHICH DENY TREATMENT
Although increasing litigation promises still greater analysis of insurance
policy contracts and the experimental nature of HDCT-ABMT, women
have been finding alternative avenues to contract challenges in order to
secure judicial enforcement of insurance coverage for their cancer
treatment.
In Hendersonv. Bodine Aluminmm, Inc., et al.,7 for example, Karen
and James Henderson brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) to appeal a district court's refusal to issue a
preliminary injunction against her health plan and insurance providers. The
Hendersons maintained that Karenfs health plan discriminated against her
when it denied her physician's request for certain treatment on the ground

65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.. 951 F.2d 89. 90 (Sth Cir. IS2).
Id.
Hooper v. Demco, Inc., 37 F.3d 287, 294 (Tth Cir. 1994).
Id.
Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.. 50 F.3d 793, 800 (10th Cir. 1595).
Id.
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc.. 70 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1995).
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that as to breast cancer, the treatment was experimental.72
In April 1995, Karen Henderson was diagnosed with an aggressive
form of breast cancer.73 Her physician recommended that she enter a
clinical trial program that randomly assigns half its participants
to a
74
regimen of high dose chemotherapy treatment (HDCT).
The Henderson's health care plan refused to pre-certi- y Henderson
for the treatment in the event that she was chosen to receive the treatment.
As a result, she and her husband instituted this action under the ADA,
claiming her health plan discriminated against her based on her cancer
type. 7' The Hendersons sought a preliminary injunction requiring Bodine
to assure payment for any possible bone marrow therapy.76
In its denial of plaintiffis request for a preliminary injunction, the
district court argued that Henderson failed to provide sufficient evidence
to show a likelihood of prevailing on her ADA claim because the insurance
plan specifically excluded coverage for most cancers and HDCT
coverage."7 In response, Henderson argued that high-dose chemotherapy
treatment for her kind of cancer is not only proven effective, but is an
accepted treatment.78 In turn, since Bodine covers HDCT for cancers,
denying HDCT treatment for breast cancer is discrimination based on
disability type, and such discrimination is prohibited by the ADA.79
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Henderson's argument
might have a chance of succeeding on its merits."0 Not only did Henderson
provide a range of medical testimony showing that HDCT is safe, widely
used, and a valuable treatment, but Bodine failed to introduce any
significant evidence to the contrary."
The ADA is based on Section 504 ofthe Rehabilitation Act, the basic
purpose ofwhich is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not denied
jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or ignorance of

72 Id.

73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995).
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others.82 The ADA contemplated the problem of disability-based
administration of employee benefits when it set forth the following
requirements necessary to establish a violation of the ADA:
(1) He or she is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) He or she was either excluded from participation in or
denied benefits of some public entity's services, programs,
or activities, or was otherwise discrminated against by a
public entity; and
(3) That such discrimination is by reason of plaintiffs
disability. 3
Although the ADA provides millions of disabled and ill individuals the
means to challenge unfair treatment in the workplace, including
discriminatory administration of benefits as evidenced by Henderson, use
of the ADA to challenge an insurer's refusal to cover HDCT-ABMT
accomplishes little more than a policy contract challenge since the issues
are subject to analysis of the same factors. For instance, in the face of their
ADA challenge the Hendersons still had to grapple with the insurance
policy's definitions of covered types of cancer and cancer treatments and
the "experimental nature" of the treatment. Fortunately for Karen
Henderson, several medical professionals were willing to step forward and
extol the virtues of HDCT-ABMT as an accepted treatment for women
with advanced-stage breast cancer. Additionally, since the defendant failed
to present any evidence to the contrary, Karen Henderson's ADA claim
survived review by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Ultimately, an ADA claim still subjects a dying woman or her
bereaved family to muddle through insurance policy ambiguities with a
hope they can find physicians who will support their plight for treatment.
However, it is still the insurance contract which remains the pivotal issue
and its interpretation by the courts can determine whether a dying patient
is entitled to treatment.
CONCLUSION AND UPDATE

82 School Bd. of Nassau County. Florida v. Arline. 4E0 U.S, 273.24 (9 -.
83 See Tyler v. City of Manhaan. 849 F. Supp. 1429 (Kan. 1994).
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In 1990, Blue Cross and Blue Shield took a bold step and decided to cover
costs for breast cancer patients in clinical trials of HDCT-ABMT. 4 The
effects of this action were three-fold. First, this action removed the
cost-barrier to patients for the expensive therapy. 5 Second, by removing
the cost-barrier, more patients were enabled to participate in clinical trials,
thus speeding up the process of determining the therapeutic value of the
treatment.86 Finally, although Blue Cross and Blue Shield still considers
the treatment "experimental," its action may help speed the process of
getting that "label" removed and encourage other insurance companies to
follow in their footsteps.

84 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Journal of the National Cancer Insfitute, Blue
Cross/Blue Shield Decidesto Cover Costs for Some Clinical Trials (1994).
85 Id.
86 Id.

